U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Conference Report / Honolulu, Hawaii by Twomey, Christopher P. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2005-08
U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue,
Conference Report / Honolulu, Hawaii
Twomey, Christopher P.
Monterey, California:  Naval Postgraduate School.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41918
  
U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 
HONOLULU, HAWAII 
AUGUST 1-3, 2005 
 
CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT , U.S. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
AND THE PACIFIC FORUM OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FOR  




Dr. Christopher P. Twomey, Dr. Peter R. Lavoy, and Ms. Elizabeth L. Stone  






The U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue brought together Chinese and U.S. strategic experts in their 
personal capacities to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in Sino-American relations with the 
aim of minimizing mutual misunderstanding and identifying practical steps for bilateral 
cooperation.  The conference was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, in collaboration with Pacific Forum 
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and with support from the Advanced 
Systems and Concepts Office of Defense Threat Reduc tion Agency, U.S. Department of 
Defense.  The American participants were primarily academics, although several had experience 
in international security issues while working for the U.S. government.  The Chinese participants 
were a mix of academics, think tank analysts, and military officers.  (Please see the complete list 
of participants at the end of this report.) The conference was held under the explicit 
understanding that all participants were speaking unofficially, as observers of their government’s 




Major General (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang and Professor Christopher Twomey listen to presentations. 
 
This first meeting of what is anticipated to be an annual series of track-two dialogues was 
extremely successful.  Both sides developed an increased awareness of the other’s threat 
perceptions and the strategic rationale for its grand strategy. Over the course of two days, U.S. 
and Chinese representatives discussed numerous pressing issues, this year centering on: the 
evolving nuclear world order, national security priorities and policies, national nuclear postures, 
regional nuclear challenges, threat reduction policies, and recognizing key sources of 
misperception and misunderstanding between them. The participants came away from the event 
with an increased understanding of what direction future strategic dialogues should take in order 
to continue a productive and rewarding dialogue, and an enthusiasm to do so. 
 




The discussions opened with the acknowledgement from both sides that China, as the fastest 
growing country in the world, is rapidly becoming a great power.  American discussants 
reiterated that Washington’s interests in Asia are and will remain a priority, and that regardless 
of who was in the White House, much of the government’s focus would be on China.  It was also 
noted that both the United States and China are at a critical juncture in their bilateral relationship, 
and both countries need to work together amicably to ensure each side better understands each 
the other’s enormous military capabilities.  As one of the American paper writers highlighted, the 
strategic relationship between any two countries can be defined as the interplay between their 
power and goals. Thus, the most important factors affecting the U.S.-China strategic relation are, 
from the U.S. side, its position at the top of the relative power hierarchy, and, from China’s side, 
its turn away from the autarchic ideological system to its current broad-based international 
engagement. With this general recognition of the centrality of the issues at stake, the discussion 
turned to a number of specific points.   
 
Strategic Level Points 
At the broadest level, Chinese participants repeatedly emphasized that their government’s overall 
outlook centered on ensuring a peaceful environment conducive to economic development.  
American participants confirmed China’s economic strength, and pointed out that China’s turn 
has made it into a worldwide economic power with particular impact on the American economy. 
It has brought into being a Chinese middle class that is forcing the government to evolve and it 
has allowed China to engage in useful diplomatic as well as economic relationships around the 
world. Everyone agreed that any assessment of the military and nuclear aspects of the strategic 
relationship must take these basics into account.  
 
American participants emphasized the degree to which their perceptions centered on an 
understanding of the vast changes that have occurred in the international security environment in 
the wake of the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  Beyond these general 
worldviews, each side engaged in frank discussions of the nature of their specific threat 
perceptions and nuclear doctrines. 
 






According to our Chinese participants, the security situation facing Beijing is very challenging. 
The evolving nuclear competition in South Asia, coupled with the worsening security situation in 
North Korea, have led to a marked deterioration of China’s regional security environment. While 
far from resolved, there seemed to be a burgeoning awareness of the extreme complexity of 
multiple deterrence relationships. China today already faces several “nuclear triangles”: China-
North Korea-U.S.; China-India-Pakistan; China-Russia-U.S.; etc. The possibility the Chinese 
participants repeatedly referred to of adding South Korea, Japan, and—most alarmingly—
Taiwan into that mix creates a very fluid and unstable situation for China. 
 
Interpretations of the Nuclear Posture Review 
 
More disturbingly, there was a persistent view in comments from Chinese participants that the 
2002 Nuclear Posture Review increased, rather than decreased, the importance of nuclear 
weapons in the Washington’s overall defense posture. (Indeed, the Chinese participants also 
typically treated the NPR as a statement of declaratory policy rather than as the “study” it was 
intended to be.)  There were repeated calls by Chinese interlocutors to reduce U.S. reliance on 
nuclear weapons in general. In fact, one participant suggested that a major challenge to global 
stability today was the emphasis that nuclear weapons states continued to put on the role of 
nuclear weapons. In this view, this emphasis stimulates nuclear proliferation and more generally 
is a key driver for other nations’ threat perceptions and security policies. 
 
Chinese Position of Strength and Weakness 
 
In playing off the complexities of the bilateral relationship, Chinese participants expressed 
something of a contradictory view of their overall position regarding the United States. On the 
one hand, they frequently made statements emphasizing China’s overall weak position relative to 
that of the United States, and alluded to certain obligations the United States must uphold as the 
leading global hegemon. On the other hand, there also was an insistence that China’s rise was 
inevitable, and that this would change the overall power distribution in the world. This 
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confidence was seen to be a recent shift in China’s views of international affairs. In the short-
term, China still openly identifies itself as weak country. However, it is more than willing to tout 
and project its potential for becoming a great leader and economic competitor. 
 
Dr. Gu Guoliang, Deputy Director of the Institute of American Studies, and Dr. Peter Lavoy, Director of the Center for 
Contemporary Conflict, shake hands on a conference well done, while Ed Smith of the Institute for Defense Analyses looks on. 
 
 
American Threat Perceptions 
 
Post 9/11 Realities 
 
At the broadest level, American participants emphasized the increased complexity of the world 
their country faced.  Rather than facing a single state- led threat that was unambiguously an 
enemy, today the United States faced a mix of state and non-state adversaries, dangers posed by 
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asymmetric strategies as much as by the actors themselves—both terrorism and weapons on 
mass destruction (WMD) proliferation were said be encompassed in this area—and states with 
whom the United States has an ambiguous relationship. China, for example, is a close trading 
partner but at the same time is a potential security competitor. This unprecedented relationship 




Most American participants at the conference felt the Sino-American strategic relationship to be 
relatively stable.  Given the existence of something approaching a secure nuclear second-strike 
capability held by both sides, American participants emphasized that the strategic nuclear aspect 
of the U.S.-China centered a few key constants.  First, they recognized that China has declined to 
enter into a nuclear arms race with United States.  Second, they insisted that the United States 
feels no threat of surprise of attack from China.  Finally, they acknowledged the reality that 
programs to improve China’s nuclear forces have been slow and noted that China’s nuclear 
programs do not bear the mark of urgency China has given to development of civilian sector, 
which is rapidly expanding (or even to other areas of military capability such as short-range 
missiles or conventional submarines). American participants agreed that if these factors were to 
change, then American threat perceptions of China would change. However, no one suggested 




In language that clearly drew on long-standing U.S. theoretical debates over nuclear deterrence, 
the Chinese participants repeatedly highlighted their reliance on “minimum deterrence” and the 
centrality of their no-first-use pledge. The goals of the nuclear force were said to be retaliatory-
based not denial-based deterrence, and counter-value not counter- force. This permits, in their 
view, a notion of “few but effective” to be appropriate for sizing their weapons arsenal. That is, 
so long as the nuclear force is effective (reliable, deliverable, etc.), it does not need to be large in 
numbers. Some participants emphasized that quantitative measures were less important than the 
quality of the deterrent that they provided. This emphasis on quality over quantity, and repeated 
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downplaying of the utility of quantity, pervaded most discussions of the Chinese force and its 
supporting doctrine.  
 
Related to this is a belief by the Chinese participants that nuclear weapons lack tactical utility, 
that they are only useful for strategic retaliation. While positive from a narrow perspective of 
American national interest, this does shape the way the Chinese view the ongoing development 
of American nuclear doctrine. From their perspective, the usability debate in the United States is 
moot: it is simply a given that tactical nuclear weapons lack utility. One important implication of 
this belief is that it leads to worst case assessments by Beijing of U.S. plans to consider future 




American participants generally emphasized the decline in importance of nuclear weapons in 
their country’s national strategy.  Several Americans indicated that this is the key motivation for 
the Nuclear Posture Review.  In contrast to Chinese perceptions regarding the American strategy, 
several U.S. participants noted that the United States has continued to reduce its nuclear 
stockpile, even under the current administration. One American participant further noted that the 
role of nuclear weapons also has receded in recent years in the security policies of France and the 
United Kingdom. Beyond that, it was also emphasized that China does not figure largely into 
U.S. policies at the strategic level. Indeed, one American participant emphasized the basic 
stability that nuclear weapons imposed on international relations in general and suggested that a 
degree of stability should be expected in Sino-American strategic relations as well (without 
entirely downplaying the challenges posed by the Taiwan issue). However, the United States is 
concerned that unless it has a firm understanding and gains more transparency into China’s 
nuclear program and intentions, the United States, as well as Russia, will be less willing to 
continue nuclear stockpile reductions.  This is particularly the case in the context of the 
modernization of China’s nuclear stockpile. 
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Listening to a presentation: Prof. Twomey, Prof. Shen Dingli of Fudan University, Dr. Jeffery Larsen of SAIC, Prof. James Wirtz, 
and Ms. Clair Bai of Pacific Forum 
 
Regional Affairs  
 
In terms of regional affairs, a number of important points emerged both in the panels that 
focused on these points in particula r and in other, more general, discussions.  
 
Beyond North Korea 
 
Both the American and the Chinese participants viewed the implications of North Korean 
nuclear weapons as transcending the Korean peninsula. The potential nuclearization of South 
Korea and Japan was discussed as a dangerous outcome, but often as the most likely outcome of 




The prospect of Japanese nuclearization was viewed with deep trepidation by the Chinese. There 
was a sense on the Chinese side that this could occur in spite of a continuing, strong U.S.-Japan 
alliance. It was noted, several times, that Japan already possessed the requisite material and 
technology programs for both weapons and missile delivery systems. The Chinese viewed 
Japanese domestic political restraints on this issue to be quite transitory. In almost a mirror 
image of American views about Chinese coercive power over North Korea, the Chinese 
repeatedly asserted that the United States, and perhaps no one else, could prevent Japan from 
proliferating. Finally, there was a sense in comments by some Chinese participants that Japan 
could be looking at the DPRK as an excuse to develop nuclear weapons. It was stressed, 
however, that a nuclear DPRK would not draw the Chinese into war.  Several Americans also 
expressed relatively positive views regarding the prospect for peaceful resolution of the nuclear 
issue on the peninsula. 
 
The issue of missile defense was again raised under the subject of North Korea, for as one 
American author pointed out, it was the threat of North Korea’s WMD delivery capacity that was 
a driver for the development and deployment of a ballistic missile defense platform designed to 
protect the United States and its allies from the threat of an adversary’s missile strike. As the 
conference participants reiterated, such a missile defense program has always been a concern for 
China, and recent developments in this arena have been viewed with skepticism. All of these 
opinions depict how a nuclear DPRK could set off numerous, both interconnected and 
unconnected, domino effects, all of which would be detrimental to regional and global stability. 
 
All of this discussion led to rather forthright condemnations of the North Korean nuclear 
program by the Chinese participants. That said, the usual statements of limits on China’s ability 




Taiwan itself, although not formally on the agenda, came up repeatedly and unsurprisingly in 
discussions. Its centrality to the Sino-American relationship was consistently emphasized and it 
was noted that this was one of only a few (perhaps the only) potential sources of military conflict 
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between the two countries. Chinese willingness to use violent means to prevent permanent legal 
separation of Taiwan was emphatically repeated. Although, paradoxically, one Chinese 
participant insisted that even after a military conflict over Taiwan, China’s ultimate objective 
would remain peaceful reunification.  
 
Chinese participants seemed convinced that U.S. policy was aimed at perpetuating the separation 
of Taiwan from the mainland indefinitely, but suggested a changed declaratory policy might 
affect this. The strong restraint exerted on Taiwan in recent months was acknowledged, but not 
viewed as a fundamental shift in policy. Chinese participants repeatedly raised the mention of a 
Taiwan scenario in the leaked NPR, and this was viewed with deep concern. Similarly, Chinese 
concerns regarding any foreign TMD coverage were again expressed. It was also explicitly 
mentioned that China is and would be very sensitive to any ballistic missile defense system 
covering Taiwan. On the other hand, there was also repeated and emphatic refutation of Gen. 
Zhu Chenghu’s statement implying a potential Chinese nuclear first use over Taiwan.  
 
The most interesting comment in this area came from a Chinese panelist who emphasized the 
importance of preventing a hypothetical Taiwan conflict from escalating or spreading. His 
comment was clearly made in the context of U.S. involvement in the hypothetical conflict. 
Similarly, others openly acknowledged U.S. escalation dominance in that situation: “It is the 





Mr. David Hamon of DTRA/ASCO and Admiral Yang Yi of NDU celebrating a successful and interesting conference. 
 
U.S. Alliances in Asia 
 
There was a genuine desire by the Chinese side to hear more discussion from the American side 
on how Washington conceives of its alliance system in the region. While extended deterrence 
concepts were repeatedly criticized, the benefits of policies based on such concepts were clearly 
valued by the Chinese side, as were discussions of positive security guarantees by nuclear 
weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states. This suggests that further discussion would be 
warranted and might improve mutual understanding. Suggesting that such learning might be 
possible, one participant wrote, “ For China, the concept of external deterrence has simply not 
entered into [the] nuclear calculus yet.” The Chinese participants desire additional discussion on 




Responding to the Chinese participants’ calls to clarify the strategic relationship between the 
United States and China, one American participant emphasized that there is no need for further 
clarification of the existing relationship between the two superpowers; what we see now is the 
relationship. It is a mixed motive relationship; one in which endemic differences exist, and in 
which each side is both part ally and part adversary. The dialectic nature of the relationship 




The Chinese also expressed concern over the new U.S.-Indian global partnership but also noted 
that relations among China, India, and the United States were very much in flux. More broadly, 
the Chinese side recognized the importance of the emerging Sino-Indian nuclear competition but 
suggested that consideration of that was only in its infancy. One Chinese participant indicated 
that Chinese support for Pakistan was at least partially viewed through the prism of the Sino-
Indian relationship. American participants emphasized the importance placed on improved U.S.-




Finally, there were a number of concrete policy-related topics that also will merit consideration 
for further discussion.  
 
The attractiveness of a mutual no-first-use pledge was apparent for several of the Chinese 
participants. American participants emphasized the importance of related “nuclear threshold” 
issues for crisis stability and escalation prevention.  These seemed to be understood rather 
differently by the two sides. (Particularly the issue of nuclear response to non-nuclear WMD use, 
EMP issues, conventional attacks on strategic targets, etc.) Chinese participants emphasized that 
their own threat perceptions depended, in part, on their understanding of American views on the 
“nuclear threshold.” Clearly, the interrelated nature of these challenging issues suggests the 




However, as discussed by one of our American paper writers, U.S. views on further defining its 
conception of nuclear threshold, or on other issues of nuclear arms control, do not—both in the 
past and at present—play a significant role in the Sino-U.S. strategic military relationship.  For 
many in the current administration, there is no arms race between the United States and China.  
Nuclear weapons remain well in the background in the political relationship, and policymakers 
on both sides seem committed to moving nuclear weapons even further into the background.  In 
China, few have seen any possible role for China in the nuclear disarmament process among the 
nuclear weapons states until such time as far deeper reductions occur in the arsenals of the 
United States and Russia.   
 
Support for PSI 
 
Chinese participants expressed sympathy for the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
While this was never expressed as unreserved, blanket support, it suggests an area for potential 
future cooperation between the two countries.  More broadly, further discussion of WMD 
proliferation issues would be useful to work out other areas of common ground and potential 
cooperation in nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities. Both sides repeatedly raised 
the topic of access to WMD by terrorists and sub-national groups, and the Chinese seemed 
particularly energized by the prospect of further WMD proliferation in their own region. 
 
On multiple occasions, however, Chinese participants emphasized the need for the United States 
to reinvest its energies into maintaining and strengthening nonproliferation regimes and 
international organizations such as the IAEA and NPT. In order to gain legitimate transparency 
and trust on security matters, they argued the United States should think about shifting away 
from the recent trend of dealing with WMD threats unilaterally or through selective, bilateral 
diplomacy to more inclusive, multilateral arrangements and relationships. The American 
participants often emphasized the degree to which this was not regarded as a viable strategy in 
Washington today. This too would appear to be a productive area for further discussion given the 
contrast between China’s preference for relatively formal organizations and the more flexible 




Utility in this Dialogue 
 
Beyond the substance, there seemed to be significant interest in the Chinese side for the process 
to continue. There was great interest in continuing to take advantage of both U.S. and Chinese 
participants to facilitate more dialogue, and to enhance confidence-building measures between 
the two countries. 
 
The Center for Contemporary Conflict at NPS, in collaboration with DTRA/ASCO, looks 
forward to the opportunity to develop this project further.  
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